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NSC BRIEFING 1-16-80 REVIEWER:

5 February 1957

RESULTS OF CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR

- I. Visits to Asian countries moderately successful.
- A. Bad press on Hungarian developments handicapped him.
 - 1. Tried to smooth over matters by criticizing "great nation chauvinism."
 - 2. Became engaged at news reporters in Pakistan
 - B. Principal disappointment was India, where failed to get
communique
 - C. Burma visit made awkward by border controversy
 - D. No immediate successes elsewhere, but he charmed many officials
- II. USSR and Eastern Europe trip highlighted China's increasing stature in Orbit
- A. Soviet reception of Chou showed importance attached to China's support
 - 1. Chou had opportunity to report on Asian reaction
 - 2. Reaffirmed dedication to bloc solidarity under Soviet primacy
 - 3. Supported USSR on threat to use force to keep bloc intact
 - B. Principal goal to impress importance of bloc unity on Poles
 - 1. Convinced Poles that Chinese sympathetic but only up to a point
 - 2. Secured Gomulka's endorsement of "proletarian internationalism."

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C. Indicated Sino-Soviet alliance still cornerstone of Peiping's foreign policy.

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NSC BRIEFING

5 February 1957

RESULTS OF CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR

1. Chou En-lai this week ended his three-months tour of 11 countries, covering over 30,000 miles of air travel. *Most of this tour was in South Asia; here his trip was at best moderately successful in his task of refurbishing Communist China's reputation as a leading champion of the Asian-African* *and in some cases less than this. In Eastern Europe he did contribute significantly to Communist bloc solidarity.*

~~camp~~

- On his Asian stops, Chou*
A. He was handicapped by the bad press on Soviet actions in Hungary.

1. He tried to smooth over matters by repeated assurances of Chinese opposition to "great nation chauvinism."
2. But he found it necessary to become increasingly defensive of the USSR. In Pakistan, he became so enraged at reporters for their goading questions on Hungary that he had to be rescued and escorted from the room.

- B. Chou's principal disappointment *probably in* was India, the only country he visited where he failed to get a joint communique.

1. He would have been willing to sign at least an innocuous document which set forth agreement on platitudes while avoiding the subject of differences, [REDACTED]

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- a. Nehru disagreed with Chou on justification for Soviet armed intervention in Hungary.

~~Nehru failed to get full Chinese endorsement of~~
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~~Indian position on Kashmir. While condemning~~

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2. ^{also,} ^{defended} where US trip came between Chou's visits.
- b. Nehru ^{for his part,} was defensive of US foreign policy to Chou. ^{Moreover, he urged the}
- c. Nehru failed to get full Chinese endorsement of Indian position on Kashmir. While condemning the UN resolution, Chou called for negotiation between India and Pakistan.
- d. Chou for his part was disappointed that Nehru came back from US with exhortation for release of the American prisoners ^{in China without offering any American} but ~~no~~ concessions from the US for Peiping.
2. Lesser Indian officials, ~~however~~, were favorably impressed by the contrast between Chou En-lai's dignified deportment and Khrushchev-Bulganin high jinks.
- C. In Burma also, Chou failed to come off with his usual shining honors.
1. Bad press on Sino-Burmese border controversy had preceded him, and he was greeted by a few unflattering placards.
2. He was agreeable to a settlement--generally favorable to Burma--along the lines he had worked out with U Nu last October, but he refused to give in to Burmese requests for still further concessions.
- D. He was courteously received elsewhere in Asia but scored no immediate successes.
1. The joint communiques signed in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example, dealt in generalities affirming the dedication of all parties to the cause of peace.
2. ^{Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800040019-5} Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000800040019-5

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officials. The Afghan deputy foreign minister told the US embassy that Chou was a most reasonable fellow and that US opposition to Peiping was a "gross error."

II. Chou abruptly interrupted his tour to fly to Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest and back to Moscow acting the role of honest broker in bloc affairs.

A. Array of top brass who met Chou at Moscow airport (Khru-shehev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Shepilov, Malenkov, Saburov, among others) and effusiveness of Soviet speeches testified to the importance USSR was placing on China's support.

1. Chou had the opportunity to tell the Russians how unsympathetic he found Asian opinion to the Soviet intervention in Hungary and probably encouraged Soviet toleration of Poland's newly won special position.

2. He reassured the Russians of Peiping's dedication to the principle bloc solidarity under the primacy of the Soviet Union.

3. The joint communique signed on 18 January warned implicitly--and a Pravda editorial two days later made the threat more explicit--that an attempt by any state to leave the bloc would be met by military intervention.

B. In Warsaw, Chou's goal was to persuade the Poles ~~xx~~ of the overriding importance of solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

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1. He convinced the Poles that Peiping sympathized with Warsaw and respected Gomulka's reservations on certain points of Soviet policy, e.g., the intervention in Hungary.
 2. He persuaded Gomulka that it was in China's interest--and presumably Poland's--to maintain essential elements of bloc unity and endorse "proletarian internationalism."
- C. The trip made clear that Peiping sympathizes with the satellites, including Gomulka's Poland, but still regards the Sino-Soviet alliance as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.